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RECENT CASES
CORPORATIONS - FOREIGN CORPORATIONS - BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS.-
GENERAL CONFERENCE OF FREE BAPTISTS v. BERKEY, 105 PAC. 411 (CAL.).-
Held, that a single act of business by a foreign corporation to come
within a constitutional provision providing that no foreign corporation
shall be allowed to transact business within the State on more favorable
conditions than are prescribed by law to similar domestic corporations,
must be an act within the ordinary business of the corporation. Shaw, J.,
dissenting.
Acts or transactions on the part of foreign corporations which do not
involve an exercise of the functions for which they were created, but are
merely incidental thereto, are usually held not to come within the meaning
of State statutes regulating the "doing" and "transactin.g" of business
by foreign corporations. Sullivan v. Sheehan, 89 Fed. 247; Commission
v. Hasten, 68 Kan. 749. Thus where an agent of a manufacturing cor-
poration was engaged in appointing agents in another State, the court
held that he was not engaged in the ordinary business of the corporation
and hence it did not amount to the transacting of business within the mean-
ing of such statute. Morgan v. White, ioi Ind. 413. But even if a single
act constitutes the ordinary business of the corporation, it is held by the
great weight of authority not to amount to a "doing of business." Ware
v. Hanilton Brown Shoe Co., 92 Ala. 145; Florsheim Bros. v. Lester, 6o
Ark. i2o. As where a corporation of anothfer State sells its property
within the State, Chattanooga R. Co. v. Evans, 66 Fed. 8og; and likewise,
where a foreign corporation owns mining land and makes a contract by
which it employs a party to develop the property. Empire Milling Co. v.
Tombstone Milling Co., xoo Fed. gio.
CORPORATIONS-POWERS-PURCHASE OF OWN STOCK.-GILCHRIST V.
HIGHFIELD, 123 N. W. io2 (Wis.).-Held, that corporations generally
have power to purchase their own stock, where the rights of creditors
are not affected, and the purchase is neither illegitimate nor fraudulent.
Timlin, J., dissenting.
Most of the courts in which this question has arisen have held that
a corporation may purchase its own stock in the absence of express re-
strictions, provided it acts in good faith and without prejudice to the
rights of its creditors. Blalock v. Kernersville Mfg. Co., no N. C. .09;
Clapp v. Peterson, 104 Ill. 26. In connection with this general rule it
was held that a bequest to a corporation of its own stock was valid.
Rivanna Navigating Co. v. Dawson, 3 Gratt. (Va.) ig. A corporation
may also take its own stock as collateral security for loans due it. Na-
tional Bank v. Case, 99 U. S. 633. And a corporation may receive its own
stock in payment of a debt. Dupee v. Boston Water Power Co., 114 Mass.
37; Crandall v. Lincoln, 52 Conn. 1oo. Although a corporation has the
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power to purchase its own stock, it has been held that it cannot borrow
funds to be used for this purpose. Adams & Westlake Co. v. Deyette, 8
S. D. iig. In England, on the other hand, the holding on the main point
is quite different, as corporations cannot purchase shares of their own stock
unless expressly authorized. Trevor v. Whitworth, 13 App. Cas. 4o9. In
several States also (California, Connecticut, Kansas, Missouri, New
Hampshire and Ohio) the power of purchasing its own stock is denied a
corporation on the ground that suck a transaction is a fraud upon the
creditors of the corporation. The leading case is Coppin v. Greenlees &
Ransom Co., 38 Ohio St. 275.
COURTS-STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS-ENFORCEMENT OF STATE AND
FEDERAL STATUTES.-SAMUELS V. COMMONWEALTH, 66 S. E. 222 (VA.).-
Held, that a former conviction for perjury in a United States court does
not disqualify an individual from testifying in his own behalf in a State
court, because neither the State nor the United States can, through its
courts, take cognizance of violations of the statutes of the other.
The weight of authority holds that a former conviction and sentence
for perjury in a State court or in a U. S. court can have no effect, either
by way of penalty, or of personal disqualification, or disability, beyond
the jurisdiction of the court, in which judgment is rendered. Common-
wealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 515; Sims v. Sims, 75 N. Y. 466. But. see contra,
Chase v. Blodgett, io N. H. 22; State v. Foley, i5 Nev. 64. Similarly, a
State court cannot take cognizance of the crime of perjury, when com-
mitted before a commissioner, appointed under the U. S. Bankruptcy Act.
State v. Pike, 15 N. H. 83; nor when committed before a commissioner
of the Circuit Court of the United States. State v. Shelley, ii Lea (Tenn.)
594; nor when committed in making an affidavit under the Acts of Con-
gress relating to the sale of public lands. People v. Kelly, 38 Cal. 145.
And the Federal courts alone can take cognizance of violations of U. S.
statutes. Martin vz. Hunter's Lessee, I Wheat. 304; Ely v. Peck, 7 Conn.
239. Neither can such jurisdiction be conferred by an Act of Congress.
U. S. v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. 4. But this doctrine is not well settled, for
decisions to the contrary are not lacking. U. S. v. Smith, I Southard (N.
J. L.) 33; Buckwalter v. U. S., ii Serg. & R. (Pa.) 193.
DIVORCE-EXTENT OF RELIEF-ABSOLUTE DIVORCE.-ORToN v. ORTON, 123
N. W. 1io3 (Mich.).-Where in an action for divorce for extreme cruelty,
the court found, on sufficient evidence, that the proof established the cruelty
alleged, it was held, that the court erred in denying the complainant any
relief, on her refusal of a limited divorce, because she had been twice
married and divorced before she married the defendant; the last previous
divorce being for her own cruelty. Grant, J., dissenting.
It is generally held that an absolute divorce should be granted where
the separation has been brought about wholly through the fault of the
defendant, the plaintiff being without reproach. McKnight v. McKnight, 5
Neb. (Unof.) 26o. Thus, where in an action for divorce, the evidence
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proved that the husband, without a mitigating circumstance, abused. mal-
treated and cruelly beat his wife, indicated that he had a vicious temper,
and showed that she would probably suffer great bodily injury by re-
maining with him, the wife was entitled to an absolute divorce. Howlett
v. Howlett, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 974. The weight of authority, contrary to
the ruling of the case under discussion, seems to be that to obtain a divorce
a vinculo inatrimonii, the applicant must be without reproach, and however
guilty the defendant, if the applicant is chargeable either with similar
guilt, or an offense to which the law attaches similar consequences, the
relief must be denied; and if the applicant, though not thus guilty, is
still not blameless, the relief must be limited to a relief a inensa et thoro.
Conant v. Conant, io Cal. 249.
FRAUDs, STATUTE oF-DEBT oF ANOTHER-CONSIDERATION.-MAXEY V.
RiDEOUT, 173 FED. 172 (Wis.).-Held, that a promoter's oral promise
to pay a debt of his corporation to a third person created a valid contract
and did not come within the statute of fraudg, for the reason that said
promoter's interest in the success of the corporation to the extent of
$Io,ooo worth of paid-up stock was sufficient to take it out of the said
statute.
One provision of the fourth section of the Statute of Frauds reads as
follows: "No action shall be brought whereby to charge the defendant upon
any special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of an-
other person, unless the agreement upon which such action shall be
brought, or some memorandum or note thereof shall be in writing, and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto
by him lawfully authorized." The receipt or non-receipt of consideration
by a promisor does not in every case determine whether a promise to pay
the debt- of another is within or without the statute of frauds; but the
inquiry remains, whether he entered into an independent obligation of
his own or whether his responsibility was contingent upon the act of an-
other. Olive v. Lewis, 45 Miss. 203. It is held that if the promise to pay
the debt of another arises out of some new and original consideration
moving between the newly-contracting parties, the case is not within the
statute. Johnson v. Knapp, 36 Iowa 616. But the mere consent obtained
by the creditor from the original debtor that the promisor may pay the
debt is not such a consideration as to take the contract out of the statute.
Osborne v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 16 Wis. 35. In any case the statute
cannot be interposed as a cover and shield against the actual obligations
of the defendant. Browne on Statute of Frauds, Sec. I65. And, there-
fore, it has been held that a parol promise to pay the debt of another
does not fall within the statute as long as there is a valuable considera-
tion independent of the original contract, moving even from the original
debtor to the promisor. Cross v. Richardson, 30 Vt. 641. Whenever the
main object of the promisor is not to answer for another but is to sub-
serve some beneficial purpose of his own, his promise is not within the
statute of frauds, although the performance of it may incidentally have
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the effect of extinguishing the liability of that other. Emerson v. Slater,
22 Howard 28. In one case the court held that if a debtor puts a fund
into the hands of the promisor upon a trust to pay the debt, the promise
to pay is not within the statute in that it is the promisor's duty to pay the
debt, so that when he promises the creditor to pay it, in substance he
promises to pay his own debt, and not that of another. Fullam v. Adams,
37 Vt. 391.
INSURANCE-CONDITION IN POLICY FOR COMPANY'S BENEFIT-WAIVER
BY GENERAL AGENT.-PACIPIC MuT. Ln INS. Co. v. CARTER, 123 S. W.
(ARK.).-Held, that a general agent of an insurance company may waive
the performance of a condition inserted in a policy for its benefit. Battle
and Hart, J. J., dissenting.
The general rule seems to be that an agent of an insurance company,
authorized to issue policies of insurance and consummate the contract,
binds his principal by any act or agreement, within the ordinary scope
and limit of insurance business. Am. Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanathan, II
Kan. 533. An this is so notwithstanding a provision in the policy that
no agent has such power. Continental Casualty Co. v. Johnson, I19 Ill.
App. 93. Or even if there are restrictions imposed upon the power of
an agent by custom as well as by the rules of the company, in regard
to making changes in the printed conditions of a policy, he still has
authority to waive a forfeiture for breach of a condition if the policy
has already been issued in a proper case and without fraud on his part
or that of the insured. Viele v. Germania Ins. Co., 26 Iowa 9. But in
any case the insured must have had no notice of the limitation upon the
general agent's power. Richard v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
114 La. 794- In the case of a general agent employing an assistant, if he
accept the assistant's acts and adopts his judgment, then the assistant has
power to bind the company by waiving the conditions of a policy delivered
by him. Davis v. Lamar Ins. Co., IS Hun. 230. And this is so even though
the assistant has been appointed without the knowledge of the company.
Harding v. Nbrwich Union Fire Ins. Soc., 1o S. D. 64. But as for a
local agent, the weight of authority seems to be that he cannot waive a
condition of forfeiture without express authority from the governing of-
ficials. Lippman v. Aetna Ins. Co., 12o Ga. 247.
JUDGES-DISQUALIFICATION-PREJUDICE.-HARGIS v. COMMONWEALTH,
123 S. W. 239 (K.).-The statement by the Commonwealth's attorney
that he had "camped on the trail of" defendant's father and now proposed
to "camp on defendant's trail, and put him where he belonged," was held,
not to show such prejudice as to disqualify him to act as judge, he being
subsequently appointed to that office, in the trial of the defendant for
murder. Nunn and Barker, J. J., dissenting.
In the absence of statutory provision, bias or prejudice on the part
of the judge does not disqualify him. People v. Williams, 24 Cal. 3I;
Cooper v. Brewster, I Minn. 94. But where under the law the bias or
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prejudice of a judge disqualifies him, it must be made to clearly appear
not only that the bias or prejudice exists, but that it is of a character cal-
culated to seriously impair his impartiality and sway his judgment. State
v. Grinstead, 62 Kan. 593; Vance v. Field, 89 Ky. 178. In Inhabitants of
Northampton v. Smith, ii Metcalf 39o (Mass.), a civil case, the rule is
laid down that in order to take a case out of the jurisdiction of a judge
the bias or prejudice must be a pecuniary or proprietary interest, or a
relation by which he will gain or lose something by the result of the
proceedings in contradistinction to an interest of feeling or sympathy
or bias which would disqualify a juror. But it has been held that any
interest, the probable and natural tendency of which is to create a bias
in the mind of the trial judge for or against a party to a suit ig sufficient
to disqualify him, although such interest is not a pecuniary one. Ex parte
Cornwell, 144 Ala. 497. Where a judge while prosecuting attorney, act-
ively participated in the preparation of a criminal case he was held dis-
qualified to try it. Mathis v. State, 3 Heisk 127 (Tenn.) ; Contra, Kirby v.
State, 78 Miss. 175. But the mere fact that he was prosecuting attorney
at the time of the commission of the offense will not disqualify him.
Wilkes v. State, 27 Tex. App. 381. Nor is he disqualified by an opinion
as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant where there is no prejudice
in his mind which will prevent defendant from having a fair and impartial
trial. State v. Morrison, 67 Kan. 144.
JUDGMENT-DEFAULT JUDGMENT-VACATING GROUNDS.-SCILLEY v. BAB-
COCK ET AL., 104 PAC. 677 (Mont.).-Held, that a default judgment, ren-
dered 35 days after the entry of the default against defendant regularly
served with process, should not be set aside on motion served about 2o days
after the judgment, accompanied by affidavit averring that defendant em-
ployed an attorney, who promised to defend the action, but who forgot
about it while he was engaged as a candidate for a public office in a political
campaign.
It has been held repeatedly that failure to appear through carelessness
or through forgetting the date is not sufficient ground for reopening the
case. So where an attorney relied on a court clerk to inform him of the
day on which a case was to be tried. Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Griffin, I Ind. App. 46. So where the defendant failed to file a demurrer
to an amended complaint which he did not know was filed and defense
was technical not affecting the merits. People v. Rains, 23 Cal. 128. Like-
wise where a railroad admitted receiving a summons, but counsel forgot
the date and the defendant did not show good defense, default judgment
was entered. B. & 0. C. R. Co. v. Flinn., 2 Ind. App. 55. A somewhat
different rule prevails, however, in other jurisdictions. Thus where a
defendant employed a lawyer who thought the action had been brought
in another county, the court held that the counsel's failure could not be
attributed to the defendant, nor be allowed to prejudice him, and that a
default judgment could be set aside within a year. Taylor v. Pope, io6
N. C. 267. So where a lawyer mistook the term day, but could show a
good defense to the case on his arrival soon after. Farmers' Mutual
Fire Insurance Co. v. Reynolds, 52 Vt. 405.
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JUSTICE OF THE PEACE-JURISDICTION-REPLEVIN-VALUE OF PROPERTY-
TIMIE.-PEPLE'S SECOND BANK V. SANDERSON, 123 N. W. 873 (S. DAK.).-
Held, that since in replevin before a justice of the peace the value of
the property must be determined as of the date the suit was instituted, the
justice having found the value of the property at an amount within his
jurisdiction, the fact that a jury on appeal to the Circuit Court found
the value at a sum beyond the justice's jurisdiction, did not show that the
justice had no jurisdiction, or that the value so found was the value at
the time the suit was begun. Corson, J., dissenting.
In action's to recover personal property the jurisdiction of the justice of
the peace is dependent upon the value of the property sought to be re-
covered. Bull v. Sledge, 82 Miss. 749. In some courts the actual value
is determined by the value as proved on trial, irrespective of the pleading.
Leslie v. Reber, 4 Kan. 315. In others, the affidavit in replevin has been
held the determining element. Burt v. Addison, 74 Mich. 73o. While
still other cases have adopted the appraised value of the property as the
criterion. Selby v. McQuillan, 59 Neb. i58. It is well settled that on
appeal from a justice of the peace the Appellate Court has only such
jurisdiction as the justice had, and if he had no jurisdiction the Appel-
late Court acquires none. Keeshan v. State, 46 Neb. 155; Kennedy v.
Pinnick, 21 Ill. 591. But where the defendant appeals from a judgment
of a justice'of the peace to the County Court, the plaintiff may by leave
of that court before trial amend his complaint, by increasing his claim
for damages to an amount beyond the jurisdiction of the justice, and
may recover such increased amount if justice in his case requires it.
Dressler v. Davis, 12 Wis. 58. And such an amendment will not show
that the justice had no jurisdiction. Sellers v. Lainpinan, 63 Wis. 256.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-LEAsE-AsSIGNMENT.-FORPES V. GORMAN,
123 N. W. io89 (MIcH.).-Held, that where a lease of the first floor and
basement of a building permitted the lessee to place electric signs on the
outside and on the top of said building, such lessee was not entitled to
lease this right to others for profit, but was only entitled to put up a
sign on the roof in connection with his own business.
A lessee of premises under a term created by a lease, whether verbal
or written, and in which no restriction is placed upon his right to assign
or sublet, may give to another the right to occupy such premises, and so
long as rent is paid pursuant to such lease the original lessor cannot
oust such occupant or sublessee. Martin v. Sexton, 112 Ill. App. i99.
Under a Massachusetts decision it has been held to be a privilege where
a person is given the right by lease to place a sign upon the outer walls
of a building. Pevey v. Skinner, xi6 Mass. 129. And so the relation of
landlord and tenant is not created where the owner of property gives to
another the right to use a sign board on the roof of his property. Rey-
nolds v. Van Beuren, 155 N. Y. 120.
MONEY RECEIVED--MoNEY RECEIVED FROM THID PERSON.--JoNES V.
JONES, 104 PAC. 786 (WAs.).-An agent, after effecting a contract for
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the sale of land, on which he received earnest money, left the state. De-
fendant, who was the joint occupant of his office, but had no other con-
nection with him or with the transaction, found among his papers an
envelope containing a certificate of deposit representing the earnest money,
which had been indorsed in blank by the agent. Defendant deposited
this on his own account, and held it subject to the agent's order. Held,
that in an action by the purchaser to recover his earnest money on failure
to complete the sale, the act of defendant in placing the money in his
own bank account would not make him liable therefor to the purchaser.
Although indebitatus assumpsit for money had, and received is one
of the common courts, 2 Harv. Law Rev. I, it is also well settled that
the action for money had and received is an equitable one, governed by
equitable principles. Law v. Uhrlaub, lO4 Ill. App. 263. Hence the action
may be maintained whenever one has money which in equity and good
conscience belongs to another. Hudson v. Scott, 125 Ala. 172. And so
when bank and treasury notes are received as money, an action for
money had and received will lie as though the money itself had been
received. Mason v. Waite, 17 Mass. 56o. Contra, Lindeman v. Lindeman,
2 J. J. Marshall (Ky.) 597. But in order to support the action there
must be some privity existing between the parties in regard to the money
sought to be recovered. Vrauex v. Ross, 98 Mass. 591. The privity may,
however, be express, as when the defendant has received money as agent
for the plaintiff, or it may be implied, as when the defendant has come
into possession male fide or on a consideration which has failed. Sargent
v Stryker, 16 N. J. L. 464.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-USE OF STREETs-CoNTRIBUToRY NEGLI-
GENcE.-BRADLEY V. JAECKEL, ii9 N. Y. SuPP. 1071.-Held, that it is not
contributory negligence as a matter of law for a person about to cross
a street to fail to look for automobiles approaching on the wrong side of
the street, as it is the duty of the driver, when on the wrong side of the
street, to either give a signal of warning to any pedestrian attempting
to cross or to have his car under such control that injury could not be
caused to such pedestrian. Lehman, J.. dissenting.
Contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff is generally a
question of fact for the jury to decide. Murphy v. Armstrong Transfer
Co., 167 Mass. i9g; Sondheim v. Nassau Brewing Co., 60 N. Y. App. Div.
463. And what constitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law is
largely determined by the particular circumstances of each case. Dennison
v. North Penn. Iron Co., 22 Pa. Super. Ct. 219. Thus, where plaintiff,
just as he stepped from the curb onto a street crossing, was struck
and injured by defendant's wagon, there being nothing in the way to pre-
vent him from seeing the wagon before he stepped, if he had looked, he
was held guilty of contributory negligence. Harris v. Commercial Ice Co.,
153 Pa. 278. While foot passengers and those driving in carriages have
equal rights in the streets of a city and both are required to exercise that
degree of care and prudence which the circumstances of the case demand.
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Brooks v. Schwerin, 54 N. Y. 343. In a case analogous to the case under
discussion, it was held not to be negligence as a matter of law to cross
a street without looking both ways for approaching vehicles. Reens v.
Mail & Express Pub. Co., 62 N. Y. St. 5u. And the same degree of dili-
gence is not required of a person about to cross a public street as would
be required at a railroad crossing. Eaton v. Cripps, 94 Iowa, 176. Nor
was it held negligent where plaintiff did not take special precaution
against the reckless conduct of defendant in riding at an unusual rate
of speed in a public street, resulting in her injury. Stringer v. Frost, 116
Ind. 477.
BILLS AND NOTES-CONSIDERATION-MISREPRESENTATI)Ns-NATONAL
BANK OF COMMERCE OF KANSAS CITY, Mo., v. ROCKEFELLER, 174 FED. 22.-
Where a guarantor of an indebtedness from a corporation to a bank in
settling his liability to the bank after the corporation became insolvent,
accepted the representations of the bank, implied, if not expressed, that
a note of the corporation then held by the bank represented an indebted-
ness which was all within the guarantee, and paid the full amount due
thereon in cash and by giving his own note, but it afterwards appeared
that the note so taken up was in a large part in renewal of an indebted-
ness antedating the guaranty and not covered thereby, it was held. his
own note to that extent was without consideration, and on repayment
of the remainder he was entitled in equity to its cancellation.
The weight of authority seems to be in accord with the above case
and holds that where a party is induced to execute a note by the misrepre-
sentation of material facts knowingly made by the payee in order to
induce the maker to execute the note, it is without consideration and
is a good defense to an action on the note. House v. Martin, 125 Ga. 642;
Conkling v. Vail, 31 Ill. 166. And the misrepresentations must have been
made at the time of the transaction, have been known to be such by the
party making them, and must have been relied upon by the other party.
Clayton v. Cavender, I Marv. (Del.) 191. But as a man is bound to
use ordinary care and diligence to guard against fraud, Clodfelter v.
Hulett, 72 Ind. 137, if he executes a note freely and voluntarily and well
understands what he is doing, it cannot be said that such note is ob-
tained by fraud and circumvention. Metcalf v. Draper, 98 Ill. App. 399.
Where there is a total fraud in the consideration or in the manner of ob-
taining it, it will render the note void. Shepard v. Hall, I Conn. 329, and
a partial want of consideration would reduce the amount of recovery pro
tanto. Stevens v. Mclntire, 14 Me. 14; Hill v. Enders, 19 II1. 163.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PERSONAL LIBERTY-RESTRICTIONS ON COSTUME.
-HAMMER V. STATE, 89 N. E. 850 (IND.).-Hreld, that the right of one
person to dress as he pleases, so long as it is not done in an offensive
way, is modified by the rule that one person may not adorn himself so
as to represent himself to be one whom he is not and thus assume a status
to which he is not entitled, and an act prohibiting the wearing of the
badge of a secret society by a nonmember is not invalid as interfering
with such right.
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There seems to be no case directly in point with the above decision,
but a fair analogy may, however, be deducible from the trade mark cases,
wherein it is held, that a trade mark or trade name by which a business
has been established, is property and will be protected. Lee v. Haley, 21
Law Times Rep. (N. S.) 547. The ground on which courts of equity
afford relief in this class of cases is the injury to the party aggrieved, and
the imposition upon the public by causing them to believe that the goods
of one man or firm are the production of another, and the intention,
therefore, would seem to be an immaterial consideration. Holmes,
Booth & Hayden v. Holmes, Booth & Atwood Co., 37 Conn. 278. So
under the police power of the State, which includes the right to regulate
the enjoyment of property, and also all matters of personal property
within the State, this right may be protected. Western Union Tel. v. Pen-
dleton, 95 Ind. 12. But where an act was passed prohibiting the use of
the national flag or emblem for commercial purposes or as an advertising
medium, and imposing a penalty for its violation, it was held that such
an act did not intend to promote the welfare, safety or comfort of society,
and therefore was not a proper exercise of police power. Ruhstrat v.
People, 185 Ill. 133.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-RIGHT TO EARN LIVELIHOOD-CONFLICT WITH
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.-STATE v. GANTZ, 50 SOUTHERN 524 (LA.).-
Held, that the law which requires certain persons to employ a master
electrician and which exempts and relieves certain other persons from
the necessity of employing him is discriminative and repugnant to the
fundamental law which requires that all persons shall be protected in
their right of property, including their right to earn a livelihood.
The right to earn a livelihood is secured by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and is subject only to constitutional regulation and to the police
power of the State Legislature. Live Stock, etc., Asso. v. Crescent City,
etc., Co.; I Woods (U. S.) 21; Powell v. Penn, 127 U. S. 678. Hence, laws
promotive of public interests placing restrictions and regulations upon
persons engaged in certain kinds of business or in certain occupations or
trades are valid if by their operation they can prevent fraud and pro-
tect the public health, comfort, safety and morals. People v. Rosenberg,
67 Hun. (N. Y.) 52; Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517. In making such
regulations some discrimination may be necessary, and that alone will
not amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws. State v.
Broadbelt, 89 Md. 565. But if the discrimination is unjust, arbitrary
and without reasonable grounds the law is unconstitutional. Marx v.
People, 99 N. Y. 377; State v. Mahner, 43 La. Ann. 496. Likewise the
State in the exercise of its police power may require that all persons pur-
suing certain occupations shall have certain qualifications. Singer v.
State, 72 Mi. 464. But the law cannot allow some to engage in a cer-
tain occupation and prohibit others of like qualification from so doing.
Gardner v. State, 58 Ohio St. 599. If the right to carry on a certain
business depends upon the consent of a public official or body of officials,
that consent must be determined upon consideration of the fitness of
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the applicant, and not upon the mere arbitrary will of the official. Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, ii8 U. S. 356.
CONTRACrs-PARTIES LIABLE.-ROGINSKY V. FREUDENTHAL, ii9 N. Y.
SuPP. 4og.-Held, that where a mortgagor conveyed the premises to a
third person, and contemporaneously with the conveyance the mortgagor
and the third person entered into an agreement under seal, which did
not show that the conveyance was made to the third person for the
mortgagee, or that the third person, in executing the contract, was acting
as attorney in fact for the mortgagee, the mortgagor could not sue the
mortgagee on the agreement, nor could the mortgagee sue the mortgagor
thereon. Scott and Ingraham, J. J. dissenting.
Where a contract is made under seal, it is the general rule that no
one but a party to the agreement is liable to be sued thereon. Huntington
v. Knox, 7 Cush. 374. But he may sue in equity provided his right in
equity is not based upon the effect of the contract at law. Cocks v. Var-
ney, 45 N. J. E. 72. Bu t to this rule there are some exceptions, as where
the instrument would be valid without a seal, it is to be treated as mere
evidence of a simple contract, though in fact it is under seal. Stowell v.
Eldred, 39 Wis. 615. In some States, however, it is held that the doctrine
permitting one to sue on a contract to which he is not a party applies
as well to contracts under seal as to simple contracts. Emmitt v. Brophy,
42 Ohio St. 82; McDowell v. Laev, 35 Wis. 171. And in many cases,
although one is not a party to an agreement under seal, he may sue on
the implied obligations growing out of such contract. Moore v. The
Granby Mining & Smelting Co., So Mo. 86. But one is not entitled to sue
thereon simply because he has ratified the contract. New England Co. v.
Rockport Granite, 149 Mass. 381.
